What if Widukind was wrong about warfare?

I feel a little bad about returning to David Bachrach’s book Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany with my claws still out after his generous and lengthy responses to my previous critiques. I’m going to do it anyway, of course, but I feel it more necessary than usual to stress to the readership that I use this blog primarily as a platform on which to look clever, and that someone else’s work gives me the chance to do so is not necessarily an indictment of it. Indeed, the first two substantive chapters of Professor Bachrach’s book are possibly the clearest narrative of the politics of the Ottonian realm under Henry I (919-936) and Otto I (936-973) that I’ve read anywhere, militarily-focused or otherwise, and the whole book does the English-reading population of historically-minded people a favour by making the Ottonians more available to us.1 But every year I have a fresh cohort of first-year students who don’t really understand what I mean by critical use of primary sources, and those same first two chapters provide me with some really good object examples.

Monte Cassino, Museo storico, Codex Casinensis 298, showing a contents page from Widukind of Corvey's Sachsengeschichte

A contents page from the oldest manuscript of Widukind of Corvey’s Sachsengeschichte, Monte Cassino, Museo storico, Codex Casinensis 298, here p. 190 (apparently)

The crucial source for much of what Professor Bachrach sets out is the so-called Sachsengeschichte of Widukind of Corvey, written up in 968 and then edited after Otto I’s death in 973, and very lately translated into English by none other than the well-known firm of Bachrach & Bachrach, indeed.2 Widukind was a monk but seems to have been unusually interested in military campaigns, so the first object lesson for my notional students: just because someone is religiously-inclined does not prevent them having good information on secular matters! You have to go further than that and establish, if you can, what bees this particular author has in his or her bonnet about such things. Now, as I say, Widukind is very often the key testimony for Professor Bachrach’s account but the trouble is that sometimes he is flatly contradicted by other sources. Let’s work through an example.

Roman walls built into later structures at Regensburg, Germany

I’m not sure how much of Regensburg’s medieval walls are left but here is some Roman work that obviously must still have been there at the time we’re writing about… Photograph by Lance Longwell

Even by 921 King Henry I was not accepted by all his German subjects, and one particular hold-out was the duchy of Bavaria, then under one Arnulf. Henry had hitherto been occupied trying to arrange peace on his western borders but with that done was able to turn his attention to Bavaria, where Widukind tells us he laid siege to Arnulf at Regensburg and that Arnulf, realising the game was up, surrendered and terms were reached.3 Well, so far so good, but this is only one version of events. The Italian diplomat, gossip-monger and courtier of Otto I, Liudprand of Cremona, writing in the period 958-962, instead records that Henry and Arnulf met with armies on the battlefield but concluded the truce there rather than fight.4 And if that weren’t enough, another text records that Henry invaded Bavaria but was driven out by the forces of an unnamed city, with terms being reached after that.5 Now, I have all these references from Professor Bachrach himself who diligently records them in a footnote, but what he doesn’t give is any reason why we should accept Widukind’s version over the other two. One might meanly suspect that it is because Widukind alone mentions a siege and Professor Bachrach has hung his historiographical hat on the importance of sieges in the warfare of the period, as we have seen.6 I’m sure it is in fact otherwise, but what could we do instead?

Later tenth-century manuscript page of Liutprand's Antapodosis now in Münich

Later tenth-century manuscript page of Liutprand’s Antapodosis, now Münich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 6338, image from Wikimedia Commons

There are several ways this could be resolved, although none of them are conclusive. I think that the anonymous Fragmentum de Arnulfo duce Bavarie can probably be ignored; its purpose was to glorify Arnulf, so it had no interest in recording his defeat, but more importantly its version offers no explanation for Arnulf actually making terms, which he evidently did as Henry went away and Arnulf was willing to fight alongside him on the eastern frontier in later years.7 Liudprand is harder to dismiss, however; he was writing earlier than Widukind and with access to Otto I’s court and anyone there who might have had memories of these campaigns, and his obvious interest in praising the Ottonians (as compared to his previous employer, King Berengar II of Italy) still didn’t lead him to give Henry a decisive victory as did Widukind.8 In some senses both are telling the same essential story: Henry brought an army and Arnulf decided it wasn’t worth fighting. The difference is that Liudprand thought that was best set in the field and Widukind saw it at the city walls, and at least implies the fighting which Liudprand denies. We don’t know why but it is possible that Widukind was making a literary choice, in which case Professor Bachrach has a problem to deal with.

Reconstruction drawing of the Slavic fortress at Brandenburg

Reconstruction drawing of the Slavic fortress at Brandenburg

Can we get any other angles on Widukind’s historiographical preferences? Yes, we can. In 928 Henry I was busy dealing with the various Slav groups on his eastern border. First among these, because they had raided his territory a few years before and because they stood in the way of any major campaign in the middle Elbe region, were a group called the Hevelli who were centred at what is now Brandenburg, where they had a fortress.9 Professor Bachrach’s account is clear and concise, so let’s use that:

“Widukind, who is our best source for this war, makes clear that Henry’s campaign against the Hevelli involved several subsidiary military operations before the urbs at Brandenburg itself was captured. He stressed that the German forces wore out the Slavs in numerous battles (multis preliis fatigans) over a lengthy period.93 It was only after he had sufficiently isolated Brandenburg that Henry deployed his army in a close siege of the fortress. Widukind draws attention to the fact that by the time Henry actually began direct operations against the Hevelli princely seat, the coldest part of the winter had arrived. As a result, the army was forced to camp on ice (castris super glaciem positis).94 Ultimately, Henry captured Brandenburg by storm, after besieging the stronghold for some time.95

“93 Widukind, Res gestae, I.35.
“94 Widukind, Res gestae, I.35. In describing the siege and capture of Brandenburg, Widukind alludes to Cicero’s speech against Lucius Calpurnius Piso. Cicero, In Pisonem, 17 reads, “exercitus nostri interitus ferro, fame, frigore, pestilentia.” Here, Cicero was listing the causes for the casualties suffered by Piso’s troops when he served as governor of Macedonia. Widukind paraphrases here listing only hunger, arms (literally iron), and cold as the causes for the casualties suffered by the defenders of Brandenburg.
“95 Widukind, Res gestae, I.35.”

There’s quite a lot that can be read between the lines here, it seems to me. One is Henry’s determination in pursuing the campaign, which may well be what Widukind wanted to illustrate: the king presumably hadn’t meant to be campaigning still in the dead of winter, which would have been nearly as difficult for his troops as for the defenders and was an occasional cause of mutiny in the Byzantine world.10 It looks rather as if siege was his last resort after trying to beat the enemy decisively in the field had failed several times. Even then, he seems to have waited before risking an assault. Presumably at each stage he hoped for a surrender that the Hevelli weren’t willing to offer. That, at least, seems as fair a reading as one that makes it all strategic wearing down of the enemy; who would have planned to make their army camp on ice? (Though that does suggest that perhaps the fortress was unreachable previously because of surrounding water—as indeed above though the Ottonian forces presumably didn’t camp on the moat—in which case Henry probably didn’t start out meaning to besiege it.)

Portrait bust of M. Tullius Cicero

Marcus Tullius Cicero, no less

But you saw the footnote, right? Object lesson number two for the notional students: always glance at the footnotes. Perhaps more important than the campaign’s duration is the unexpected presence of this guy in the text, this of course being Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman orator and politican of the first century B. C., and with him arrives a possibility unsettling for someone wanting to read Widukind straight here, to wit that he had a written model in mind for how this situation should be described that was nothing to do with what had happened. For most history undergraduates in the UK I guess that this methodological problem is first opened up to them when briefly studying Charlemagne, because they will be set to read Einhard’s Life of Charles and if their teacher’s any good, will then be faced with the fact that Einhard borrowed almost all of his description of Charlemagne from Suetonius’s Twelve Cæsars, in order to make Charlemagne truly the image of his Roman imperial predecessors.11

Portrait denarius of Charlemagne as Emperor (812x814)

Silver denier of Charlemagne, struck at an uncertain mint in 812-814, Künker sale 205 (March 12 and 13, 2012), lot 1405, now in a private collection

Silver denarius of Emperor Vespasian struck at Rome in 69-71, Beast Coins Z2844

Silver denarius of Emperor Vespasian struck at Rome in 69-71, Beast Coins Z2844

The good ones will then work out, of course, that if Einhard was picking descriptions from twelve different emperors to describe one, the best reason for him to select the bits he did was probably because they actually fitted Charlemagne—it’s like my bit about formulae mentioning dovecotes in charters, most probably used because the property in question actually had a dovecote. Maybe the same thing was happening here, so that Widukind had a historical story to tell and saw how perfectly the Cicero quote could fit it. We can hope so, especially since there seems to be no other lifting from Cicero in the story. But one does have at least to think about it. Now, I’m sure that Professor Bachrach has thought about all these questions, for the very simple reason that he’s put the evidence that provokes them in his own footnotes! But I wish he’d had space also to explain how he resolved them in favour of Widukind’s accuracy each time.

1. David Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany (Woodbridge 2012, repr. 2014), pp. 14-69.

2. Widukind, Res gestae Saxonicae, ed. & (German) transl. Albert Bauer & Reinhold Rau as “Die Sachsengeschichte des Widukind von Korvei” in Bauer & Rau (edd.), Quellen zur Geschichte der sächsischen Kaiserzeit (Fontes ad historiam aevi Saxonici illustrandam), Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters 8 (Darmstadt 1971), pp. 1-183, (English) transl. Bernard S. Bachrach & David Bachrach as Widukind of Corvey, Deeds of the Saxons, translated with an introduction and notes (Washington DC 2014).

3. Widukind, Res gestae, I.27; Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, pp. 20-21, citing Widukind at p. 20 n. 38.

4. Liudprand of Cremona, Antapodosis, ed. Paolo Chiesa in Chiesa (ed.), Liudprandi Cremonensis Opera omnia: Antapodosis, Homelia paschalis; Historia Ottonis; Relatio de legatione Constantinopolitana, Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Medievalis 156 (Turnhout 1998), pp. 1-150, transl. in F. A. Wright (transl.), The Works of Liudprand of Cremona (London 1930), pp. 27-212, II.21, cit. by Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, p. 20 n. 38.

5. Fragmentum de Arnulfo Bavariae, ed. Philipp Jaffé in Jaffé (ed.), “Annales et notae S. Emmerami Ratisbonensis et Weltenburgenses” in Georg Heinrich Pertz (ed.), Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Scriptores in folio) XVII (Hannover 1861, repr. 1990), p. 570 of pp. 567-576, cit. by Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, p. 20 n. 38.

6. Thus also ibid. p. 22 where Adalbert of Magdeburg, who describes a siege at Metz in 923, is preferred over Flodoard of Reims who describes a different sort of campaign by the German king. They both make it look as if their preferred king won, of course, and maybe there’s something going on where Flodoard focuses on the invading king as a general force of unjust destruction and Adalbert has him single-mindedly focused on the target, Bishop Wigeric of Metz, who had attacked a royal estate. That’s only my speculation, though, and doesn’t settle the question.

7. Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, pp. 29-30.

8. On Liudprand’s agenda, see Karl Leyser, “Ends and Means in Liudprand of Cremona” in James Howard-Johnston (ed.), Byzantium and the West c. 850 – c. 1200: proceedings of the XVIII Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Oxford 30. March – 1. April 1984, Byzantinische Forschungen 13 (Amsterdam 1988), pp. 119-143, repr. in Leyser, Communications and Power in the Middle Ages, ed. Timothy Reuter (London 1994), 2 vols, I, pp. 125-142, but in searching out that reference I find also the very relevant-looking Antoni Grabowski, “‘Duel’ between Henry I and Arnulf of Bavaria according to Liudprand of Cremona” in Roman Czaja, Eduard Mühle & Andrzej Radziminski (edd.), Konfliktbewältigung und Friedensstiftung im Mittelalter (Torún 2012), pp. 387-400, which I have not seen but seems worth mentioning.

9. Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, pp. 27-28, quote below on p. 28.

10. As under Maurice in 592: see Andrew Louth, “Justinian and his Legacy (500-600)” in Jonathan Shepard (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge 2007), pp. 99-129 at p. 127.

11. See Matthew Innes, “The classical tradition in the Carolingian Renaissance: ninth-century encounters with Suetonius” in International Journal of the Classical Tradition Vol. 3 (New Brunswick 1997), pp. 265-282.

8 responses to “What if Widukind was wrong about warfare?

  1. David Bachrach

    Dear Jonathan,

    As with regard to your earlier post about my book, I very much appreciate the publicity that you are generating, and if I should see a spike in sales, I will stand you a drink at Leeds. Thank you also for the kind words about the first two chapters of the text.

    But with regard to the two issues that you raise, I believe that some contextualization and commentary is necessary. So please forgive me for invading the space of your blog again.

    The initial passage from Widukind (1.27) that you mention states: “After this success, Henry marched to Bavaria where Arnulf ruled as duke. Henry found Arnulf defending the city, which is called Regensburg, and besieged him there. When Arnulf realized that he could not resist the king, he opened the gates and went out to meet the king. He submitted himself and his entire duchy to Henry.”

    Liudprand’s story, which is much lengthier, starts in this way: Antapodosis, 2.21 “Rex Heinricus, cum obtemperare suis omnes iussionibus, Arnaldum solummodo resistere cerneret, pervalido collecto exercitu Bagoariam tendit.”

    Liudprand then goes on to say that Arnold gathered a large army with which to face Henry, but when the two armies came into contact, Henry thought that such a battle would lead to a great loss by both sides, and so asked Arnulf to meet him in a face to face conversation. During this conversation, Henry explained to Arnulf that he could not win, and Arnulf then went back to speak with his advisors, and in the end, (2.23) “Arnaldus suorum hoc optimo bonoque consilio, Heinrici regis miles efficitur et ab eo, ut iam dictum est, concessis totius Bagoariae pontificibus honoratur.”

    As you point out, the basic facts of Henry I’s invasion are clear. Both Widukind and Liudprand state that Henry advanced into Bavaria with a very large army with the intention of making Arnulf submit, and that Arnulf submitted.

    When considering the two stories, one has the appearance of a set-piece rhetorical display, but it is not the account by Widukind.

    But leaving aside Liudprand’s rhetorical flourishes, including his lengthy description of Henry I’s private dialogue with Arnulf, that no one else heard, what are the practical military considerations here?

    Henry invaded Bavaria with an army that he thought sufficiently large to compel Arnulf to behave himself now and in the future. It turns out that Henry correctly judged the size of the army that he would need for this purpose in light of Arnulf’s subsequent behavior as described by chroniclers other than Widukind, including the pro-Arnulf author of the Fragmentum de Arnulfo duce Bavarie.

    Under these conditions, what is the likelihood that Arnulf sought out battle in the field against a superior opponent rather than withdrawing to Regensburg? This is precisely what Arnulf’s sons did when Otto I invaded Bavaria in 938 for the first time, and were successful in holding out against the new king. This is also what the Bavarian rebels did in 953 and were successful in holding out against Otto despite his presence in Bavaria for several months. Moreover aside from the specific cases in Bavaria, what examples are there of one commander seeking a military confrontation in the field with another commander in the context of an open-field battle during the first half of the tenth century? I know of no such set piece encounters. All of the battles fought by Henry I, Otto I, and their various commanders involved either the relief of a siege, or an ambush. The one possible exception is the battle of the Recknitz where Otto I found himself trapped at a ford at the end of a long and tenuous supply line. The battle of Riade, where Henry sought a confrontation with the Hungarians, was supposed to be an ambush, and also took place in the context of a siege.

    Finally, in terms of evaluating the sources of information available to the two authors, and also their audiences, it is widely accepted by specialists dealing with Widukind’s text not named Johannes Fried that Widukind was writing for, and commissioned by the Ottonian court, and that the first version of his text was written in the same time frame as Liudprand’s. By contrast, it is not clear that Liudprand was writing for Otto I, although he certainly had positive things to say about the Ottonian dynasty and benefitted from Otto I’s patronage. On balance, it appears that Liudprand is the one who was making a literary choice in order to permit him to place a speech in the mouth of Henry I, something that he does on several other occasions as well. A speech works much better in a face to face confrontation in a field than it does with Arnulf shouting down from the walls of Regensburg.

    As to my preference for accounts that focus on sieges, it also would be useful to point out that Widukind stresses sieges throughout his text, and if we were to convert the military encounter with Arnulf from a siege to a confrontation in the field, this would place the ratio at 45 sieges to 13 confrontations in the field. (In this, Widukind was quite consistent with all of the other contemporary writers, including Liudprand when he was not indulging in his practice of following in the tradition of Thucydides.

    With regard to the second issue, namely Widukind’s use of a phrase from Cicero to describe the denoument of the siege of Brandenburg, I find somewhat confusing your statement “with him arrives a possibility unsettling for someone wanting to read Widukind straight here, to wit that he had a written model in mind for how this situation should be described that was nothing to do with what had happened.”

    The idea of a medieval author borrowing a snappy phrase from either a classical or biblical text to show off is so well established in scholarly studies of medieval writers that it does not require repeating except perhaps to first year university students.

    But in this case, the phrase actually was particularly apropos because both Widukind and Cicero were discussing casualties. Of course, Widukind modified the phrase, as I make clear in the note, to make it appropriate to his present context.

    But other than this minor point, what could Widukind’s borrowing from Cicero possibly imply in your view? Are you suggesting that Henry I’s troops did not suffer from the cold, or that some of the men were not killed by iron weapons? Or are you suggesting that Henry did not capture Brandenburg?

    In addition, there are three further assumptions that you make that also should be considered in more detail, namely that Henry’s campaign against the Hevelli began in 928, that he sought a decisive battle against the Hevelli, and also that he did not want to fight a winter campaign. Here, one must be aware of both the archaeology for the Hevelli region, and also know what Henry did after capturing Brandenburg in wintertime. (“Henry I of Germany’s 929 Military Campaign in Archaeological Perspective,” Early Medieval Europe 21 (2013), 307-337).

    It seems very likely that Widukind telescopes time in his discussion of Henry I’s campaign against the Hevelli. The peace agreement with the Hungarians that gave Henry a free hand against the Slavs took place in either 924 or 926 (the date that I prefer), and his campaign that resulted in the capture of Brandenburg took place over the winter of 928-929. This provides a period of several years in which Henry could undertake military operations against the Hevelli, operations that came to a head in the winter of 928-929 with the final siege of Brandenburg.

    Next, it is necessary to know that Brandenburg was defended by a belt of fortifications to its west and south, almost all of which were constructed in the decade before 929 according to the most recent dendrochronological dating. Before Henry could assault Brandenburg, he needed to reduce these fortifications in order to avoid placing his army in the dangerous position of undertaking a siege in enemy held territory at the end of an extended supply line. Far from chasing down bands of Hevelli warriors looking for a fight, the German king was seizing and garrisoning their fortresses before the final showdown at Brandenburg. It is likely that this did not happen in a matter of a few months, but rather took place over a period of years in light of the number of strongholds involved.

    Third, if Henry was opposed to a winter campaign, it is hard to reconcile this with his subsequent actions, which included maintaining his army in the field for the next several months after the capture of Brandenburg, first turning south toward the Sorb fortress at Gana, and then marching further south to Prague. Along the way, Henry began construction of the fortress at Meissen, which is dated by dendrochronology to 929. Excavations of a number of the Hevelli and Sorb fortresses along the line of Henry I’s march show catastrophic destruction by fires also dated through dendrochronology to 929. Finally, Henry’s army arrived at Prague in the spring, having spent the entire winter capturing fortresses along the Elbe river. None of these actions suggest that Henry I was concerned about leading his army on campaign in winter, Emperor Maurice’s bad experience notwithstanding.

    • Another lengthy and generous reply, to which my short answer would be: I see how you couldn’t fit all that in the book, but I hope you can also see how I got to my positions from what you did put there! I would certainly agree that few authors of the tenth century are less likely to have been making rhetorical flourishes than Liudprand. Still, it’s worth working these ideas over for an audience that may include those with even less historical training than my notional first-years…

      Just to clarify—because now that I look, you’re quite right, it’s not clear in the post—I focused on Widukind’s borrowing from Cicero as a way that we might explain his difference from Liudprand in the earlier extract. I suppose, not knowing the text as you do, that if I were really trying to make an argument for Cicero bending his account of the Brandenburg campaign I would suggest that maybe it didn’t last into the cold of winter as the application of the quote would demand. But the extra information you now provide makes that seem less likely, even if I assume it is mostly coming from Widukind too. You are of course be perfectly right to point out that exactly the same exercise with Classical antetypes can also be performed on Liudprand’s text, and at the point where I note his difference from Widukind too, rather than this later one. Nonetheless, what is actually in your book offered the possibilities which I exploited here as examples of technique.

  2. Jonathan,your quote from the translated list of causes of deaths described in Professor Bachrach’s book omits “pestilence”.

    Also, the coin of Charlemagne most nearly resembles a later Emperor, particularly Constantine and his successors.

    • I think, indeed, that Constantine is the archetype for the coin (as indeed he is for ours!) but I wanted one of the Twelve Cæsars so as better to justify the illustration.

      The quote from Professor Bachrach’s book is correct as stands; I take his point to be that Widukind did not want to count illness as one of the things that got the Hevelli (quite possibly because it didn’t).

  3. Antoni Grabowski

    Being to some extent called out in the note 8, let me make some remarks on the discussed matter. I read with great pleasure prof. Bachrach’s book and agree with many things said on how Ottonians ruled, but at the same time I concentrate in my own work on the ways chroniclers constructed their narrations, leaving aside to what extent they replicate the reality. Thus I will concentrate here on the narratives themselves.
    The problem with Liudprand and Widukind’s accounts and the differences between them comes from the different concepts behind author’s vision. This is nicely seen in Arnulf case, but it is not limited to that (a lot of this differences constituted my PhD, someday hopefully published). In discussing Liudprand’s account, the story does not begin with Henry moving his army into Bavaria, nor even Arnulf’s return from Hungarians (where he ran to hide from Conrad I). The story begins with the rise of Conrad I and the very short description of his reign.
    Liudprand wanted to convey an image of Ottonians who were better than any other ruler of Europe. This was done by highlighting them as king’s who never shed Christian blood. Therefore Bishop of Cremona’s narration emphasizes that for example Lotharingia was from beginning part of Henry’s realm and to do that, he introduced Giselbert of Lotharingia into Conrad’s deathbed scene.
    Therefore Bavaria and Arnulf are set up to show Henry’s qualities as a reluctant king (Björn Weiler’s rex renitens) and at the same time, king who will refrain from fighting fellow Christians. To this Liudprand conceived the story of Henry inviting Arnulf to a talk (which latter took as an invitation to a duel) and in the well written poem Liudprand presented the dilemma Arnulf had: does he really want to kill Christians? Thus Henry who could defeat his enemy in a battle, or even in a duel, but instead chose to use words leaving sword to fight of the Hungarians (which happened immediately afterward in Liudprand’s text), becomes an ideal king in Europe full of rulers more willing to kill other Christians than fight the outside enemies.
    Widukind on the other hand was more interested in making a comparison between week and ineptitude Conrad, who in series of campaign failed to pacify the kingdom, and Henry who easily attained this. Conrad attempted to take from Henry’s hands the Duchy of Saxony and then died in the effect of failed incursion into Arnulf’s Bavaria. Henry, who had fortuna atque mores easily dominated the kingdom with swift movement of his army forcing Burchard and Arnulf to accept his reign.
    Therefore Widukind’s description is more “militaristic”, than Liudprand’s. I would refrain from saying which version is closer or further from the truth, as both clearly have certain narrative schemes and motifs behind them. More so, the rhetorical flourishes does not make a text more fictitious, but rather, a “better” written from the literature stand point. Not to mention that sometimes a narration full of rhetorical tools and quotations from classics, could at the same time be fairly faithful in reproducing what happened in the past.
    Nevertheless, if I was a military historian I would probably (as prof. Bachrach) go with Widukind as the basis/main source for “warfare”. The same goes when talking about politics.

    There is also a bigger question of for whom Liudprand wrote. I would not say that the intended audience was Otto, but nevertheless Antapodosis was written as some sort of court’s propaganda that was meant to show that Otto deserved the title of emperor. There are other propositions, but in my opinion they do not hold the water.

    The mentioned in the note article, in which I would probably change a thing or two, is available here: https://www.academia.edu/3162140/_Duel_between_Henry_I_and_Arnulf_of_Bavaria_according_to_Liudprand_of_Cremona

    • Aha, that’s handy as I couldn’t see a way I was easily going to get hold of that. Thankyou much more, however, for the erudite explanation of our authors’ agendas! If I ever do point students at this post as a lesson in source critique, they are going to get some very fine examples! I also hope that your Ph. D. makes it to print…

    • Also, I have amended the misspelling of your first name in n. 8, sorry about that!

  4. Pingback: A somewhat unexpected interpretation of Asser | A Corner of Tenth-Century Europe

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